Well here it is https://lnp.org.au/election-review/
I have posted the executive summary of the review below. A pdf of the full text of the report can be found at the link above.
I think the report correctly finds that the LNP election campaign was poorly conceived and badly executed. Given the closeness of the election I believe it is nearly certain that a better campaign would have returned the LNP to power.
However, I think the report (as is common with these things) is more focused on message strategy than with the fundamental problems of the Newman Government: that is, it's hard to win an election if you annoy the public servants, the doctors, the lawyers, the police and the nurses. Add to that the "Hard Choice" election strategy ("I can offer you nothing but blood, sweat and tears"), in hindsight, it shouldn't be surprising that the election was lost.
Further, I can't help but think there is a more fulsome version of the report.
Enjoy.
Overview
1.1 The Review’s purpose primarily, is to reflect on the loss of the January 31 2015 state election . It considers too, matters that refer to the Liberal National Party (LNP) and its membership. The views contained in member’s submissions, other communications and our own political and party experiences have guided our thinking and are contained in the report and the recommendations below.
1.2 To each member who took the time to make a submission either by email or letter or spoke privately with us - thank you for your thoughtful and considered insights and recommendations. In all, between 600-700 communications were made to us. Each submission was read, salient points and recommendations extracted and views weighed in the balance in the context of the totality of the comments expressed and our own political and party understandings.
1.3 Our recommendations are forward-looking and do not seek to apportion blame.
1.4 The LNP was forged by the rank and file membership on the 25th July 2008 as a strong, competent and forward thinking grass roots party. Since then and over the ensuing seven years the party has experienced highs and lows - the joy of winning government and the disillusionment of election defeats. Along that journey, the party has become a competent corporate entity in which members can take pride.
At this juncture of the party’s development and following the loss of the election it is timely to reflect on the processes and policies where the party may improve its organisational and campaign processes and better serve the membership.
1.5 The overwhelming election win of 2012 led to hubris and a false sense of security consolidating an energetic and reformist government leadership team but without parliamentary experience. The huge influx of inexperienced new MP’s and a leader without parliamentary background contributed to a lack of corporate history in the conduct of parliament and the party room.
1.6 Broad based disappointment has been expressed with the campaign and the election defeat. Undoubtedly, the leadership of the government contributed to the election loss including:
- the breaking of the promise that public servants had ‘nothing to fear’;
- the perception of arrogance arising from not listening to the people;
- pursuing the large scale privatisation of assets to which the majority of voters opposed or had serious reservations;
- the alienation of key stakeholders in the decision making process; and the two year discordant relationship with the organisational wing.
1.7 The campaign itself, the responsibility of the central campaign committee had inherent problems such as failing to:
- address the perception of the Government’s arrogance and to turn this weakness into strengths;
- promote the government’s considerable achievements in fixing “labor’s mess’ and growing the state’s economy;
- launch an attack program to rebut the deceitful and untruthful propaganda of the party’s opponents; engender confidence with local campaign committees; and
- manage the expectation that the party with its large majority would hold government at the poll.
1.8 Based on our experiences, we know that leadership is both important and difficult and should not be underestimated. The political tactics of importing a leader from outside parliament without parliamentary or state leadership experience and policy knowledge carried inherent risks which were not immediately apparent and in the short term worked well.
1.9 While criticisms can be levied at the style of government it is without doubt that much was achieved from 2012 to 2015. Campbell Newman made a significant commitment to the LNP in resigning as Lord Mayor of Brisbane to contest the premiership from outside of parliament. His contribution to the conservative politics in Queensland should be recognised.
1.10 Real progress was made in addressing the State’s economic crisis, making Queensland safer, cutting red tape, improving basic services in health and education, sustaining the environment etc. Across all portfolios there were substantial improvements in service delivery and performance and it is one of the tragedies of the 2015 campaign that we failed to get this message across to Queenslanders.
1.11 The Springborg/Langbroek parliamentary team will build on the policy achievements in government and have learnt from the experiences that alienated voters, the organisational wing and membership. A positive open door partnership is being pursued with Queenslanders based on sound policy, integrity and trust. Its relationship with its organisational wing is now being built on one of consultation, collaboration and respect.
1.12 The criticisms in this report should not detract from the fact that Queensland was left a far better place than that the LNP inherited when it came to office in 2012.
