Triumph or blunder?

Gillard's promise of closer ties with Beijing has upset the US and left us hostage to China.


Whether you see last week's new ''strategic partnership'' with China as a diplomatic triumph or another policy stumble depends on your view of the relationship between America and China.


Over the past few years Washington and Beijing have increasingly seen one another as direct strategic and political rivals in Asia - manifested in China's assertiveness over maritime disputes, and in America's strategic pivot to Asia.


The Obama administration will be alarmed at Australia so obviously succumbing to China's pressure, and slipping further into China's orbit.


But it has also shown up in wider regional diplomacy. As they compete for power and influence, any gain for one is a loss for the other. Australia is one of the prizes in this grim game. Every move Canberra makes in one relationship rebounds on the other. The relationships can't be kept in separate compartments.


This is the harsh new reality for Australia. Neither America nor China will allow us to keep the two relationships separate because, at the strategic and political level, our intrinsic value as a partner matters to each of them far less than our symbolic value as a prize.


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This is the key to understanding last week's events in Beijing. Why did the Chinese agree to annual leaders' meetings and a ''strategic partnership''? We can read the answer in China's press, which praised the new ''strategic partnership'' as showing that Australia was moving away from America's orbit and closer to China's. A clear win for Beijing.


Last weeks ''strategic partnership'' deal is Beijing's counter-move to America's deployment of marines to Darwin. When it was announced in 2011, Prime Minister Julia Gillard was sure China wouldn't mind. She saw it as something between the US and Australia.


She was wrong. Beijing saw the decision as part of America's strategy to contain China. And so did Washington. Getting Australia to agree to the Darwin deployment was not about training marines. It was about sending a clear signal that Australia was on America's side.


When Beijing quietly made its displeasure known, Gillard quickly lost her zeal for ever-closer defence ties with the US. Australia has now become very wary about any further US initiatives, while the Asian Century white paper was full of phrases Beijing likes to hear. China's leaders have been pleased, and last week in Beijing they gave Gillard her reward.


They also took a hostage. Last week's promises of a closer relationship will be easy to take back next time Canberra displeases Beijing. This will make Gillard all the more sensitive to China's interests, knowing Beijing can easily turn her diplomatic triumph into a political disaster. It is unlikely, for example, that the new defence white paper will say anything to upset Beijing.


None of this is going unnoticed in Washington. They are disappointed Canberra has distanced itself from America's strategic moves against China, and they will be dismayed by Gillard's eagerness for ''strategic partnership'' with their rival.


Australia's warming relations with Beijing will worry Washington in exactly the same way that US marines in Darwin worried Beijing. Whatever they say publicly, the Obama administration will be alarmed at Australia so obviously succumbing to China's pressure, and slipping further into China's orbit. In Asia's zero sum game, this win for China is a loss for them. Gillard can expect a call from Washington.


What then should Gillard or her successors do? The first essential step is to recognise and accept that Australia now faces a quite new diplomatic and strategic situation. It used to be true that Australia did not have any choices to make between the US and China. Today it isn't, because their relationship with one another has changed.


And in the past, if we did ever face such choices it would have been easy to choose America. Now that is not so easy, because of what China has become. In our entire history no country has ever been as powerful in itself, or as important to Australia, as China is now, except for Britain and America. We have never before faced a situation where our ally's biggest strategic competitor is also our biggest trading partner and our region's strongest power.


The idea that we can keep these two relationships in separate boxes is an illusion. That doesn't mean we will inevitably be forced to choose one or the other. It does mean that our diplomacy must carefully weigh how each move we make with one will be viewed by the other. We will avoid the disaster of having to make a final choice between them only by continually choosing carefully how far to go in either direction.


In striking this balance between Washington and Beijing, Australia faces an unprecedented diplomatic challenge. Nothing in the experience of our political leaders or their official advisers has prepared them to meet it, and they respond by denial. That puts Australia at risk. It leaves us as a powerless shuttlecock between our most important partners. As Paul Kelly wrote last week in a slightly different context, it makes us seem ''a weak and confused nation, easily intimidated, hopeless at realpolitik and deserving the contempt of great powers''.


Hugh White is professor of strategic studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU.




 

I know that you believe you understand what you think I said, but I'm not sure you realize that what you heard is not what I meant.
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Triumph or blunder?

 i thought we were hostage to big mining and the select few . however, how can a closer relationship to our source of wealth be a bad thing ? do you suggest we throw sticks and stones and get offside with china ? that would be foolhardy . i'm sure Mr Abbott agrees with me .

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Triumph or blunder?

For years thinking has been Australia is more part of Asia than USA.


 


Maybe Australia is growing up and the US  should do the same.


 


(Yes I am aware of how much good the US has done as well as being aware of its' failings)

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Triumph or blunder?

Perhaps you are both missing the point.


We have now been committed to 2 allies who do not have the same ideology and disagree with each other.


To please one side puts the other off-side. Australia will be walking a knife edge, make a wrong move and we get sliced.


Strategically that is about as useful as teats on a bull.


 

I know that you believe you understand what you think I said, but I'm not sure you realize that what you heard is not what I meant.
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Triumph or blunder?

Correct me if I'm wrong, but don't I recall you saying on another thread that anything Australia does has no significance on the world stage.


 


"Australia is a mere pigmy (sic) in the scheme of things." were your exact words, I believe.

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Triumph or blunder?

sliced how exactly ? will our US allies punish us for propagating better relationships with china or will our chinese trading partners stop selling us flat screens ? what do you envisage happening ?

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Triumph or blunder?

 Why I disagree with Hugh White on China's rise


by: Paul Dibb


 


Paul Dibb is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University


 


 


THERE is no more important policy challenge for Australia than the future relationship between the US and China.


Hugh White has raised serious questions about how to manage that relationship and, in particular, his view that the US should share power as an equal with China (discussed comprehensively in The Weekend Australian on August 11-12 ).


I disagree with much of his analysis and policy prescriptions for the following reasons.


First, he exaggerates the dangers in tensions between these two powers and, especially, the risks of conflict leading to nuclear war. He says competition between the US and China will inevitably lead to confrontation and military conflict. That did not happen in the more dangerous Cold War confrontation between the USSR and the US.


This was because it was clearly understood on both sides just how destructive a nuclear exchange would be. And yet, White


suggests a scenario in which a military incident in the South China Sea could lead to China dropping a nuclear weapon on American military bases in Guam, and the US doing nothing in retaliation.


In other words, the US, with more than 5000 strategic nuclear weapons, has backed down and accepted nuclear devastation on its territory with all the precedents that would set.


Second, there is little recognition of just how limited China's military capabilities are. It is simply not good enough to accept the pumped-up claims of the US Naval War College that US aircraft carriers are vulnerable to ballistic missile strikes by China.


I've heard all these exaggerated views before out of the US. Of course, China is developing some serious modern capabilities but do we actually believe that the US will sit on its hands and do nothing? Unlike America, China has no experience of modern war and much of its military technology is either reverse engineered from Western designs or bought from Russia, which has made no technological breakthroughs for more than 20 years.


Ballistic missile attacks on US aircraft carriers from China's mainland would simply invite devastating blows on targets inside China.


As for US power sharing and treating China as an equal, why should the US create what former prime minister Paul Keating calls "strategic space" for it? What is being implied here: giving China all the South China Sea or a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia or a free hand to threaten Japan?


The fact is that the correlation of forces in our region leaves China with no real friends other than Pakistan and North Korea.


Given China's aggressive posture, practically every other major country in the region is moving closer to the US. When China's foreign minister threatens members of ASEAN by stating that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries", he is acting like a bully. Little wonder that China's strategic space is limited.


Then there is the question of human rights and asserting, as do both Keating and White, some sort of moral equivalence between US values and those of China. Both seem to imply that because the Communist Party of China has taken hundreds of millions of people out of poverty this somehow cancels out its gross human rights abuses. Let's just remember that China's Communist Party was responsible in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution for more than 30 million deaths of its own people.


And, in recent memory, this was the party that rolled the tanks over students in Tiananmen Square. There is no way Washington will concede moral equivalence to a communist regime.


Finally, what about White's proposal for a Concert of Asia in which China and the US would share power? As he acknowledges in passing, this would risk sacrificing the security of middle and small powers.


It must be remembered that in the Concert of Europe in the 19th century middle powers such as Poland either disappeared or were carved up. Just what is proposed here for countries such as Vietnam? Moreover, the Concert of Europe worked because there was a common European culture, which does not exist today in Asia.


The fact is that the situation between China and the US is nowhere near as perilous as suggested by Keating and White.


Nuclear deterrence and increasing economic interdependence will act as a brake on military adventurism by both sides.


Moreover, as Australia's former ambassador to China, Geoff Raby, points out, China is utterly dependent on foreign markets and is in reality a highly constrained power.


Meanwhile, China will need to readjust to the fact that the US is refocusing on our region after been absent in the Middle East for the past decade. Beijing will no longer have the luxury of free kicks to unilaterally assert its power in the region.


The likely evolution is not some formal Concert of Asia but a mixture of good old-fashioned power balancing and prudent hedging on both sides.

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Triumph or blunder?

I vote for Hugh White as having the more convincing appraisal ๐Ÿ™‚

I know that you believe you understand what you think I said, but I'm not sure you realize that what you heard is not what I meant.
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Triumph or blunder?

Besides in both senarios Australia remains the "knife edge' walker

I know that you believe you understand what you think I said, but I'm not sure you realize that what you heard is not what I meant.
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Triumph or blunder?

the knife is as blunt as an eBay samurai sword.

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